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From a Duty to Remember to an Obligation to Memory? 
Memory as Reparation in the Jurisprudence of the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights
Maria Chiara Campisi, European University Institute, Florence, Italy
Commemorations and reparations are central elements of the transitional justice agenda. The inclusion of memory-related measures among the steps that 
states are expected to take along the transitional process has been progressively translated from the transitional justice domain to the language of inter-
national law. Judicial and quasi-judicial human rights instances have required states to make and undertake memorials, commemorations and public acts of 
remembrance, both as an instrument of reparation for the individual victim and as a mechanism to warn against the repetition of the same abuses in the fu-
ture. As a result of this trend, memory-related measures have progressively become part of the state obligation to provide reparations to victims. The inclusion 
of memory-related measures in the scope of the international obligation to repair, however, raises some thorny issues. This review of the jurisprudence of the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights in relation to memory-related orders and analysis of the case of the memorial El Ojo que Llora in Peru critically as-
sesses the emerging trend of using memory-related initiatives as measures of reparation determined by judicial organs.
Acts of reparation in response to the suffering of people 
whose human rights have been abused are essential in pro-
cesses of democratic transition and reconstruction as states 
emerge from situations of pervasive and systematic violence. 
In cases of the most serious and large-scale abuses of human 
dignity, however, the very concept of reparation is problem-
atic. The classical system of reparations under international 
law focuses on instruments of restitution and monetary com-
pensation. However, scholars and practitioners in the transi-
tional justice field agree that these forms of reparations are 
both unsustainable and insufficient to redress the unspeak-
able suffering that victims of massive human rights abuses 
experience (Antkowiak 2008, 355; De Greiff 2006, 452 ff.; 
Shelton 2005, 389–91). In response, models and theories of 
transitional justice have suggested alternative forms of redress 
that have progressively entered into human rights fora.
This article sheds light on the use of commemoration and 
memorialisation initiatives as reparatory practices under 
international human rights law in contexts of transition 
from internal conflicts and authoritarian regimes. In these 
contexts, memory-related measures have been used both as 
an instrument to provide satisfaction to victims and as a 
means for the responsible government to assure the injured 
society and the international community of its commitment 
to preventing similar atrocities from happening again.1 I 
argue in the article that these measures, directed to preserv-
ing the memory of the past, may serve the task of meeting 
This article was produced in the context of the His-
torical Justice and Memory Conference, hosted by 
the Swinburne Institute, Melbourne, 14–17 Feb-
ruary 2012. As such, the analysis concludes at that 
date, and it has not been substantially updated 
since its acceptance and peer review for publication 
in this journal.
I wish to express my sincere appreciation to the 
focus section editors, Dan Anderson and Klaus 
Neumann, for their constant assistance, guidance 
and support throughout the preparation and pub-
lication process. I extend my thanks also to the 
reviewers for helpful comments on earlier version 
and to the participants at the Emerging Scholars 
Workshop at the Historical Justice and Memory 
Conference (Melbourne 2012) for the fruitful dis-
cussion of the topic addressed in this article. I am 
particularly grateful to Louise Vella and Hermann 
Ruiz for their contribution to some of the thoughts 
developed in the paper.
1 Throughout the paper the term “memory-
related measures” is used to refer to material and 
symbolic acts or processes of memorialisation and 
commemoration.
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the victims’ needs of redress more accurately when taken 
together with the other forms of reparations. The adoption 
of these measures by judicial and quasi-judicial bodies, 
hence, can be viewed as an attempt to adjust the human 
rights framework to provide better forms of redress for 
human suffering. Furthermore, to include memory-related 
initiatives in the framework of reparations suggests that, in 
the aftermath of massive violence, any viable construction 
of the future has to pass through a thorough recognition 
and knowledge of the past. In this way, reparative memorial 
practices progressively move from the transitional justice 
field to find a place within the system of reparation for 
human rights violations. Practices of memory become com-
ponents of the international legal obligation to repair.
This paper sets out to elucidate aspects of this dialogue 
between instruments of human rights law and those of tran-
sitional justice. First, it sketches the legal regime of the state’s 
obligation to provide victims with reparations under inter-
national human rights law. From this perspective, the paper 
shows the need for the classical framework of reparations to 
adjust to situations of massive and systematic violations of 
human rights and introduces the role of memory-related 
initiatives in such a renovated system. The second section 
critically analyses how memory-related initiatives have been 
concretely interpreted and adopted as remedial measures in 
the case law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(IACtHR or the Court). In the final section, the paper pres-
ents the Peruvian case study of the memorial “El Ojo que 
Llora”, in Lima, in order to reflect upon possible impli-
cations and problems of including memory-related ini-
tiatives in reparation orders issued by supranational bodies.
Aware of the complex issues that this analysis raises, the 
paper offers an example of the broader processes of sub-
suming transitional justice forms into legal institutions. At 
the same time, however, the contribution identifies the 
problems involved, pointing out hurdles and risks of using 
memory-related initiatives in legal settings, especially when 
the mediation of supranational institutions with binding 
powers on states comes to interfere with the sensitive and 
often painful process of social negotiation and interpre-
tation of the past.
1. Memory-related Initiatives as Instruments of Reparation
1.1. Rethinking the Framework of Reparations under International Human 
Rights Law
The right to reparation for victims of human rights abuses 
is now a well-established principle of law. Most of the 
international and regional instruments of human rights 
protection expect states to provide reparations in the case 
of violations committed by their agents against individuals, 
and establish secondary norms that include both substan-
tial and procedural remedies.2 While these instruments 
rarely name specific measures and actions that states 
should undertake in order to fulfil their obligation to pro-
vide redress, they require remedies to be “effective” (Ant-
kowiak 2008, 356). Human rights bodies have also 
contributed to the establishment of the victims’ right to 
reparation and clarified its content and features. The 
Human Rights Committee, for instance, has on many occa-
sions acknowledged that reparations are a central element 
of the system of human rights protection and pointed out 
that – “where appropriate” – the obligation to repair may 
involve a broad set of measures other than compensation, 
including measures of satisfaction, such as public 
apologies, public memorials or guarantees of non-repeti-
tion.3 In general, however, these bodies let states decide 
which kind of reparation measures to adopt, while estab-
lishing general parameters of adequacy and effectiveness.4
2 Within the human rights discourse, the right to 
reparation is often understood as incorporating the 
substantial dimension of the right to a remedy. As 
Dinah Shelton argues, the right to a remedy includes 
“both the procedural right of effective access to a 
fair hearing and the substantive right to a remedy” 
(2005, 114). The latter expresses itself in the obli-
gation to provide victims with reparation.
3 HRC, General comment no. 31 [80], The nature 
of the general legal obligation imposed on states 
parties to the covenant, 26 May 2004, CCPR/
C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, para. 16, http://www.unhcr.org/
refworld/docid/478b26ae2.html. See also the UN 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(CESCR), General Comment No. 16, Article 3. The 
equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of 
all economic, social and cultural rights, 
E/C.12/2005/3, 13 May 2005, paras 21, 27.
4 The Committee on the Elimination of Dis-
crimination against Women (CEDAW), for example, 
emphasized in a number of documents the state 
duty to “take all legal and other measures that are 
necessary to provide effective protection of women 
against gender-based violence, including […]: (i) 
Effective legal measures, including penal sanctions, 
civil remedies and compensatory provisions to pro-
tect women against all kinds of violence […]”. 
CEDAW, General Recommendation no. 19, 11th 
session, 1992, para. 24 (t; t(i)).
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International law principles governing the responsibility of 
states for violations of international obligations also con-
tribute to regulating the matter of reparations.5 In the after-
math of gross and systematic human rights violations, 
however, when huge numbers of victims seek reparations 
from governments often in precarious economic and 
administrative conditions, these principles – based on 
monetary compensation and restitution – prove inadequate 
(Shelton 2005, 389–90; Mégret 2010, 10–13; Rombouts, 
Sardaro and Vandeginste 2005, 352–54).6 In such cases, in 
fact, it is not possible to expect states – as those principles 
do – to restore the pre-existing state of affairs before the 
violation was committed, simply because it is impossible to 
return life, health or family ties to victims. At the same 
time, it is not possible to provide full redress for this kind 
of harm through monetary compensation. Not least, 
because the physical and moral damage refuses financial 
quantification. Monetary compensation, in fact, may even 
be interpreted by victims as an attempt to buy their silence 
and, as such, be perceived as a further moral injury (Bran-
don 2000, 220; Roht-Arriaza 2004, 180). Furthermore, 
monetary compensation may fail to consider the collective 
dimension of massive violence. It may eventually result in 
isolated and limited initiatives adopted in favour of specific 
victims or discrete categories of victims, therefore gener-
ating tensions among victims and exacerbating divisions 
within the society (De Greiff 2006, 456–59). The com-
plexity of the harm caused to individuals by serious trans-
gressions of fundamental rights and the specificities of the 
contexts in which those abuses take place therefore require 
a different – and careful – assessment of victims’ needs.
In order to address this inadequacy in the traditional rep-
aration system, both human rights scholars and judicial 
and quasi-judicial human rights institutions have 
embraced a more generous understanding of the obli-
gation to provide reparations to victims of grave and wide-
spread violations. There is a broad literature about the 
scope and content of this obligation. Research has been 
conducted from within the perspectives of human rights 
(Van Boven 2009; Shelton 2005; Du Plexis 2007), transi-
tional justice (De Greiff 2006; Díaz Gómez, Camilo Sán-
chez and Uprimny Yepes 2009), social and political studies 
(Guembe 2006), anthropology and psychology (Danieli 
2009). These analyses all agree on the need for a complex 
and holistic approach to victims’ healing, which takes into 
consideration the specificities of the contexts of massive 
violence and the gravity of the abuses. As a result, new 
forms of reparations, mostly borrowed from the transi-
tional justice field, have been developed.
1.2. UN Principles on the Right to a Remedy for Victims of Gross 
Violations of Human Rights
The first legal instrument at the international level that set 
out to conceptualise the new approach to reparations in 
cases of massive violence was the Basic Principles and 
Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy for Victims of Gross 
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law (hereafter 
Basic Principles). Adopted by consensus in Resolution 
60/147 of the UN General Assembly in December 2005 
(United Nations General Assembly 2006), the Basic Prin-
ciples are the result of the long process of collection, study, 
analysis and revision of practices of and provisions on the 
issue of reparations for victims of massive violence, led by 
two UN Special Rapporteurs, Theo van Boven and M. Che-
rif Bassiouni (United Nations Commission on Human 
Rights 1993, 2000). As General Assembly resolutions gen-
erally do not impose legally binding obligations upon 
states, the Basic Principles, as appropriately pointed out in 
the text, “do not entail new international or domestic legal 
obligations but identify mechanisms, modalities, pro-
5 Restitution of the status quo ante and com-
pensation are the two typical forms of reparations 
under classical international law. According to the 
general principles governing the responsibility of 
states for the violations of international obligations, 
in fact, the international obligation to repair is a 
consequence that automatically arises from the viol-
ation of international rules. The content of such 
obligation is defined by the principle of full repar-
ation, which implies that any damage, either moral 
or material, is to be fully made good. This parameter 
has been generally regarded as a principle of cus-
tomary international law and interpreted as the state 
obligation “to wipe out all the consequence of the 
illegal act” (PCIJ, 1928), either by restoring the pre-
existing state of affairs before the breach was com-
mitted, or providing full redress of the harms 
through monetary compensation. The principles 
governing the Law of State Responsibility have been 
codified by the International Law Commission in 
the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001).
6 For an empirical study on the problematic role 
of monetary compensation in compensating victims 
for massive and systematic violence, see Guembe 
2006, 37–38.
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cedures and methods for the implementation of existing 
legal obligations” (United Nations General Assembly 2006, 
Preamble, 7). Despite this non-binding status, the Basic 
Principles have quite strongly influenced trends and behav-
iours of national and international bodies, including the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights. While a detailed 
review of the Basic Principles is beyond the scope of this 
article, the following section provides a brief overview of 
the aspects that are most relevant for the present dis-
cussion. This will enable the reader to gain better insight 
into the reparatory system put forward by this instrument 
and to understand the role that memory-related measures 
can play within it.
In the final text, the state obligation to provide reparations 
is included in the broader state duty to provide victims 
with effective remedies, itself a part of the general obli-
gation to respect and protect human rights (United 
Nations General Assembly 2006, principle 3). After draw-
ing a parallel between the obligation to grant remedies and 
the corresponding right of victims to obtain “adequate, 
effective and prompt reparation” for losses suffered (prin-
ciple 11b), the Basic Principles provide general guidance 
for reparation programs. In the text, the scope and content 
of the state obligation to repair appears broad and multi-
faceted (Van Boven 2009, 38). Resolution 60/147 indicates 
a rich set of measures that further specify the components 
of the victims’ right to reparation. These measures are clas-
sified into five remedial categories: restitutio in integrum 
(restitution), compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and 
guarantees of non-repetition (United Nations General 
Assembly 2006, principle 18). In comparison with the clas-
sical reparatory framework, thus, the Basic Principles keep 
the traditional measures of restitutio in integrum and com-
pensation, while introducing new forms of redress – reha-
bilitation and guarantees of non-repetition – within the 
scope of the obligation to repair. Notably, among these cat-
egories, satisfaction plays a crucial role and gains a new rel-
evance in the whole system of reparations. The category of 
satisfaction, in fact, becomes a box containing a variety of 
reparative measures – including memory-related ini-
tiatives. According to principle 18, measures of satisfaction 
include: (a) actions aimed at putting an end to the viol-
ations; (b) the establishment of inquiries and truth seeking 
mechanisms; (c) the search and identification of the dis-
appeared and reburial of bodies; (d) official recognition of 
and (e) public apologies for the violations; (f) punishment 
of those responsible; (g) commemorations and tributes to 
the victims; and (h) publicity concerning the events con-
stituting the violations in education training and pro-
grams. 
The Basic Principles, overall, seem to support the idea that 
when a wrongful act affects deeply personal and intimate 
aspects of human dignity, effective restoration of the status 
quo ante is unrealistic (and, under certain conditions, even 
undesirable), and that monetary compensation alone is an 
inadequate form of redress. The different forms of repar-
ation embraced by the Basic Principles, when taken 
together, aim to address better the complexity of the harm 
in those situations of widespread and gross human rights 
abuses. As Dinah Shelton (2005, 149) rightly notes, their 
combination, together with the criterion of proportionality 
suggested by the text, allows (quasi-)judicial instances the 
necessary discretion to tailor appropriate forms of redress 
to specific cases. This multi-dimensional approach offers a 
model for shaping national reparation programs, making 
them more effective and accurate in responding to victims’ 
harm. The central role given to satisfaction, together with 
the inclusion of rehabilitation and guarantees of non-
repetition in the list of victims’ remedies, eventually seems 
to suggest new standards of adequacy, which shift the 
traditional understanding of reparation and embrace a 
more casuistic and victim-oriented approach.
The formal inclusion of memory-related measures in the 
list of measures of satisfaction is meaningful. Frédéric 
Mégret (2010), in an article on the possibility and feasibil-
ity of the International Criminal Court recommending the 
construction of “sites of conscience”, offers an in-depth 
analysis of the effects of commemorative measures as tran-
sitional justice tools and, in particular, of the different 
functions that these initiatives can serve in the healing pro-
cess for victims. Mégret highlights the expansive role which 
monuments – broadly understood – can play in reparation 
schemes aimed at addressing the aftermath of mass viol-
ence. Their functions range from the restoration “of the 
good name of the victims” to providing a forum of 
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mourning, discussion and reflection about the past; offer-
ing a path for social reconciliation; and warning future 
generations against the repetition of similar atrocities.
Indeed, from a theoretical point of view, memory-related 
measures that have an impact on individual as well as col-
lective processes of dealing with the past and are strictly 
linked to the very concepts of time and identity, appear 
uniquely suitable to thoroughly rethink the concept of rep-
aration. The inclusion of memory-related measures in the 
realm of remedies broadens the principle of full reparation 
so that it no longer coincides with the obligation “to wipe 
out all the consequences” of the violence. In the aftermath 
of mass atrocities, nothing can or has to be wiped out, but 
rather the harm must be acknowledged, brought to light 
and commemorated, both to restore victims’ dignity in 
suffering and to convey a warning to future generations.7 
Reparation, in this way, loses its meaning of closure and 
opens up a new relation among past, present and future. 
The inclusion of memory, as the presence of the past, in the 
dynamics of reparation may allow the idea of reparation to 
move from meaning a closure with the past, to the idea of 
reparation as a means of “transformative justice”, in the 
sense of development, progress, advancement (Mani 2005, 
78–80).8 Although these theoretical developments have not 
been fully explored yet, there is a trend in the practice of 
reparations for victims of massive and systematic violence 
clearly moving in that direction.
2. The Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
 2.1. Principles of Reparation in the Jurisprudence of the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights
A considerable part of the evolution of international 
human rights law in the field of reparation to individuals is 
due to the progressive jurisprudence of the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights. Since its establishment, the Court 
has greatly strengthened the regional system of human 
rights protection in the Americas, adopting a victim-
friendly approach in its case law.9 On the issue of repar-
ations, since the landmark Velásquez-Rodríguez case, the 
Court has progressively moved from rigidly applying the 
international law principles of reparation to a more flexible 
approach.10 Following the traditional system, the concept 
of reparation was initially understood by the Court mainly 
as monetary compensation that would provide redress for 
a single individual. However, in the Aloeboetoe v. Suriname 
case in 1993, the limits of this system were revealed and the 
Court acknowledged for the first time the intrinsic insuffi-
ciency of the pure compensatory model. The case con-
cerned acts of violence perpetrated by soldiers against a 
group of young Maroons in Suriname in 1987. After the 
state’s recognition of its responsibility for those violations, 
including the extra-judicial execution of seven men of the 
group, the Court ordered Suriname “as an act of repar-
ation” to reopen the school in the village of origin of the 
victims and to create the conditions to enable it to func-
tion.11 After that decision, in the subsequent case law, in 
addition to compensations the Court has ordered non-
pecuniary measures as part of the reparative scheme.
The Court’s case law has therefore progressively broadened 
the content of the state obligation to provide reparations 
beyond compensation and the Court has eventually 
embraced the reparative model set forth by the Basic Prin-
ciples. In line with them, today it understands reparation to 
include the five components mentioned above: restitutio in 
integrum, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and 
preventive measures.12 Because of the concern that the 
Court has shown for non-monetary damages, it has paid 
particular attention to satisfaction among these categories. 
The category of satisfaction has been used by the Court to 
create a rich and flexible set of secondary obligations, 
7 For a discussion of the role of recognition and 
acknowledgment in healing victims of gross human 
rights violations see, inter alia, Schotsman 2005, 
109–20 and Rombouts, Sardaro and Vandeginste 
2005, 465–66.
8 The same idea was developed further by Mani 
in The Aesthetics and Ethics of Repairing Historical 
Injustice, keynote speech delivered during the His-
torical Justice and Memory Conference, Melbourne, 
16 February 2012.
9 For an analysis of the Inter-American system of 
reparations for human rights violations see, among 
others, Pasqualucci 2013 and Shelton 2005.
10 Case of Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras. Rep-
arations and Costs. Judgment of July 21, 1989. Series 
C No. 7.
11 Case of Aloeboetoe et al. v. Suriname. Repar-
ations and Costs. Judgment of September 10, 1993. 
Series C No. 15, para. 96.
12 The Court referred to the Basic Principles on 
several occasions. See, for instance, the case of 
Loayza Tamayo V. Perú. Reparations and Costs. 
Judgment of November 27, 1998, Series C No. 42, 
para.85.
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which it imposes on responsible states as a consequence of 
their obligation to repair. On many occasions the Court has 
ordered responsible states to integrate direct payment of 
compensation with non-pecuniary measures. States have 
been asked to pay for medical and psychological care and 
rehabilitation; to cover costs for education; and to locate 
human remains and to return them to families. In other 
cases the Court has called for preventive measures to 
ensure the non-repetition of further abuses, such as train-
ing programs and courses on human rights for the armed 
forces and the general population, as well as structural 
changes to domestic law.
 2.2. The Role of Memory in the Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court
What role do memory-related measures play in the 
IACtHR system of reparations? In a series of judgments 
issued since the end of the 1990s, the Court has ordered 
states to adopt memory-related initiatives as an element of 
reparation in the aftermath of internal conflicts or internal 
violence, where states severely violated the most fundamen-
tal of their citizens’ rights. While prescriptions connected 
with preserving the remembrance of the past were initially 
rather sporadic and limited to naming buildings in the vic-
tims’ honour, in the latest developments their application 
has been more frequent and they have taken more sophis-
ticated forms.13 The use of memory-related initiatives as 
form of reparation has resulted in different measures such 
as naming schools, streets and squares after victims;14 erec-
ting memorials;15 installing plaques in places where the vic-
tims were killed;16 publishing accounts of the violations in 
official gazettes or newspapers.17 These measures all foster 
the construction and protection of a certain consciousness 
of the past. Setting to one side, however, this common final 
aim: what is the rationale on which the Court bases its 
memory-related orders? The legal bases used by the Court 
to order such measures appear quite ambiguous and the 
juridical argument behind them is not always explicit. 
However, a close reading of the Court’s case law suggests 
two patterns. First, the Court generally distinguishes 
between cases where reparation is aimed at compensating a 
single individual and cases where the measure has to pro-
vide redress for a whole community or group. Second, from 
a technical point of view, the memory-related measures 
decided by the Court differ from each other according to 
the category of reparation in which they are classified; that 
is, some of them are issued as an instrument of satisfaction 
for victims, others as measures of prevention.
These two different criteria of distinction – beneficiaries 
and legal categories – intertwine and seem to suggest a line 
of reasoning in the Court’s judgments. First, when mem-
ory-related initiatives are ordered as a means to provide 
satisfaction to the specific victim, the Court mostly relies 
on the right of the family or the next of kin to preserve 
their beloved’s memory, whose legal justification is pri-
marily linked to the right to know the truth. Some other 
interesting lines of reasoning have also been put forward to 
justify these measures. Judge Cançado Trindade, for 
13 In Radilla Pacheco, for instance, accepting the 
initiative of the State, the Court ordered the pub-
lication of “a bibliographical sketch of the life of 
[the victim], accompanied either by the repro-
duction of official documents regarding this case 
(admissibility reports, orders, expert reports) or 
with oral testimonies on his trajectory [sic], 
gathered in situ, for which the State would hire an 
investigator.” Case of Radilla-Pacheco v. Mexico. 
Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and 
Costs. Judgment of November 23, 2009. Series C No. 
209, para. 355. Similar measures were ordered also 
in other cases, such as in Myrna Mack Chang v. 
Guatemala, where the Court asked the State to pub-
licly honour the memory of the police investigator 
who was killed while investigating the case. Case of 
Myrna Mack-Chang v. Guatemala. Merits, Repar-
ations and Costs. Judgment of November 25, 2003. 
Series C No. 101, para. 278.
14 Case of the “Street Children” (Villagrán-
Morales et al.) v. Guatemala. Reparations and Costs. 
Judgment of May 26, 2001. Series C No. 77; Case of 
Trujillo-Oroza v. Bolivia. Reparations and Costs. 
Judgment of February 27, 2002. Series C No. 92; 
Case of Servellón-García et al. v. Honduras. Merits, 
Reparations and Costs. Judgment of September 21, 
2006. Series C No. 152; Case of Molina-Theissen v. 
Guatemala. Reparations and Costs. Judgment of July 
3, 2004. Series C No. 108; Case of the “Juvenile Ree-
ducation Institute” v. Paraguay. Preliminary Objec-
tions, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of 
September 2, 2004. Series C No. 112; Case of Vargas-
Areco v. Paraguay. Merits, Reparations and Costs. 
Judgment of September 26, 2006. Series C No. 155.
15 Myrna Mack-Chang v. Guatemala (2003); Case 
of the Plan de Sánchez Massacre v. Guatemala. Rep-
arations and Costs. Judgment of November 19, 
2004. Series C No. 116; Case of the Moiwana Com-
munity v. Suriname. Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations and Costs. Judgment of June 15, 2005. 
Series C No. 124; Case of the Mapiripán Massacre v. 
Colombia. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment 
of September 15, 2005. Series C No. 134; Case of the 
Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia. Merits, Repar-
ations and Costs. Judgment of January 31, 2006. 
Series C No. 140.
16 Case of the Ituango Massacres v. Colombia. Pre-
liminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. 
Judgment of July 1, 2006. Series C No. 148.
17 Case of the Miguel Castro-Castro Prison v. Peru. 
Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of Novem-
ber 25, 2006. Series C No. 160; Case of the Rochela 
Massacre v. Colombia. Merits, Reparations and 
Costs. Judgment of May 11, 2007. Series C No. 163.
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instance, in a number of separate opinions to the Court’s 
judgments, developed the idea of a moral obligation to 
remember, arguing from the corresponding moral (but cer-
tainly non-legal) right of the dead victim to be remem-
bered. In his separate opinion to the Moiwana Community 
v. Suriname judgment, he wrote: “It is incumbent upon all 
of us, the still living, to resist and combat oblivion, so com-
monplace in our post-modern, ephemeral times. The dead 
need our faithfulness; they are entirely dependent upon it. 
The duties of the living towards them [...] encompass per-
ennial remembrance [...]”.18 In spite of the strong moral 
force of this argument, however, the remedial function of 
memory-related measures is the prevailing rationale in the 
legal reasoning of the Court in individual cases. Second, 
memory-related measures have also often been ordered 
with a preventive function, as instruments to prevent simi-
lar abuses from occurring again in the future. When this 
occurs, especially in cases involving whole communities, 
memory-related initiatives aimed at perpetuating the 
remembrance of the horrific violations throughout time, 
are seen alongside – reparation to individuals – as instru-
ments for conveying a lesson to future generations. As 
such, they become components of the state’s general obli-
gation to protect human rights.19
These two different perspectives seem to imply the adop-
tion of different forms of memorialisation. In fact, when 
the case related to one victim or a limited number of vic-
tims, the Court has ordered ad hoc prescriptions aimed at 
restoring the victim’s memory as due satisfaction. For 
instance, in Radilla Pacheco v. Mexico, concerning the 
forced disappearance of a Mexican citizen at the hands of 
Mexican Army agents in 1974 and the subsequent lack of 
investigation by the judiciary, the Court ordered the state 
to hold a public act of acknowledgment and to place a 
commemorative plaque to the victim’s name in the city 
where the crime occurred. The Court stated that those 
measures were due “in satisfaction of the memory of [the 
victim]” and “with the objective of preserving the memory 
of [the victim] within the community”. In addition, the 
Court ordered the publication of a bibliographical sketch 
of the life of the victim to honour his memory.
On the other hand, however, when a large number of 
people or a whole community was affected by the violence, 
the memory-related orders issued by the Court have con-
sisted of broader memory-related projects, such as building 
monuments and creating sites of memory, often in addi-
tion to other preventive tools for non-repetition. These 
measures have frequently been ordered in cases involving 
massacres and violations of the rights of indigenous com-
munities.20 The Plan de Sánchez Massacre case offers a good 
example. It relates to a massacre of more than 250 persons 
perpetrated by a unit of the Guatemalan army in the village 
of Plan de Sanchez on 18 July 1982. Most of the victims, 
who suffered atrocious abuses before being killed, were 
indigenous Maya-Achì people. In the decision on repar-
ations the Court, after requiring the state to “honour pub-
licly the memory of those executed” during a public act of 
recognition, ordered Guatemala to fund maintenance and 
improvements to the chapel where the Maya community 
commemorate the victims of the Plan de Sánchez mass-
acre. According to the Court, “this would help raise public 
awareness to avoid repetition of events [...] and keep alive 
the memory of those who died”.21
The Court applied this reasoning again when, in another 
case of forced disappearance – the Anzualdo Castro case – it 
18 Moiwana Community v. Suriname (2005). Sep-
arate Opinion of Judge A. A. Cançado Trindade. 
Such a fascinating interpretation had already been 
put forth by Cançado in his Separate Opinion to the 
Street Children case (2001). See also Castilla del 
Pino (2006). It has to be noted, however, that the 
individuals who are entitled to obtain reparation are 
only those who suffered a prejudice to their right. 
Where victims of abuses are dead, their next-of-kin 
are entitled to obtain redress for the harm they suf-
fered for the loss.
19 Radilla-Pacheco v. Mexico (2009), paras. 
353–56.
20 See Moiwana Community v. Suriname (2005), 
para. 218: “For those very reasons – to memorialize 
the events of November 29, 1986, as well as to pre-
vent the recurrence of such dreadful actions in the 
future – the State shall build a monument and place 
it in a suitable public location.” Mapiripán Massacre 
v. Colombia (2005), para. 315: “The State must build 
an appropriate and dignified monument in remem-
brance of the facts in the Mapiripán Massacre, as a 
measure to prevent such grave events happening in 
the future.” The same wording appears in Pueblo 
Bello Massacre v. Colombia (2006), para. 278. Like-
wise in Ituango Massacres v. Colombia (2006), para. 
408: “In addition, the State must erect a plaque in an 
appropriate public place in La Granja and in El Aro, 
so that the new generations are aware of the events 
that took place in this case.”
21 Plan de Sánchez Massacre v. Guatemala (2004), 
paras. 100 and 104.
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rejected Peru’s offer to comply with its duty to provide sat-
isfaction to the victim by, among other things, realising the 
project of a “Museum of Memory”.22 However, whilst in 
the previous cases the Court had limited itself to issuing 
memory-related orders without further elaborating on 
their foundation, in Anzualdo it seems to highlight the 
rationale behind these measures. After affirming the 
importance of vindicating the name and dignity of the vic-
tim and his next-of-kin, the Court argued that the con-
struction of a memorial museum could not constitute an 
“adequate individual measure of satisfaction”, however 
important this would be to restore and rehabilitate the “his-
torical memory of the society”. Based on this consideration, 
both as a measure of individual satisfaction “in order to 
preserve the memory of [the victim] and as a guarantee of 
non-repetition”, in accordance with the claims of the vic-
tims’ representatives, the Court instead required the state to 
place a commemorative plaque in the name of the victim.
The two purposes of memory-related initiatives – satisfac-
tion and prevention – can therefore overlap. Indeed most of 
these measures are ordered by the Court in order to accom-
plish both. In the Radilla-Pacheco case, for instance, it was 
ruled that the restoration of the victim’s name was import-
ant in order to prevent future violations and that memory-
recuperation initiatives serve “both for the preservation of 
the memory and satisfaction of the victims, and recovery 
and reestablishment of historical memory within a demo-
cratic society”.23 Thus, in the realm of reparations, the use 
of memory-related initiatives by the Court becomes a 
means to address both the individual and collective need 
for redress within the society. As a result, the double func-
tion of these measures reflects and adapts to the dual nature 
of memory, in its collective and individual dimensions.
What the Court does not seem to consider, however, are 
the possible tensions that may arise between these two 
dimensions and between the goal of commemoration and 
other transitional justice aims, such as reconciliation. 
Admittedly, in some of the memory-related orders, the 
Court required the specific implementation of the mem-
ory-related initiatives to be decided by the state after con-
sultation and in agreement with the parties involved in the 
case (i.e. the victims and their relatives).24 However, 
especially in cases involving civil wars, ethnic conflict or 
the abuse of minority groups, the victims are in general 
just one of the parties involved in the pattern of violence. 
Judicial decisions have a limited scope, as the effects they 
produce are generally legally binding only for the legal 
parties to the case. As a consequence, ad hoc forms of com-
memoration ordered by judicial decision and focussed on a 
single victim or a specific group can leave out a number of 
victims and create a ranking of legitimacy among victims’ 
narratives and memories. Moreover, the right of the victim 
to have his or her own individual narrative publicly com-
memorated, as a form of redress for his or her own suffer-
ing, can clash with the broader community’s interest in 
overcoming social conflicts and tensions. The inclusion of 
memory-related initiatives in reparation schemes demands 
a thoughtful consideration of extra-legal aspects of the 
processes of coming to terms with the past.
3. Can the Law Impose Memory?
The IACtHR’s jurisprudence has made important advances 
toward shaping new forms of reparation better suited to 
redressing the harm and suffering caused by gross and mass 
atrocities. Nevertheless, as suggested, the inclusion of mem-
ory-related actions as a component of a state’s obligation to 
repair raises some thorny issues: To what extent is it desir-
able that judicial instances, including supranational institu-
tions like the IACtHR, mediate the process of elaboration 
and reconstruction of the past? What effects do the “judicial 
truths” established in the decisions on reparations issued by 
these instances produce in the complex process of negoti-
ation of collective memory within a society? What is the 
impact of these judgments on the interplay between the 
individual (recognition) and social (reconstruction) 
demands placed on memory as an instrument of reparation?
22 Case of Anzualdo Castro Prison v. Peru. Merits, 
Reparations and Costs. Judgment of Septmber 22, 
2009. Series C No. 202, para 200.
23 Radilla-Pacheco v. Mexico (2009), para. 356.
24 See inter alia, Moiwana Community v. Suri-
name (2006), para. 218; Case of Goiburú et al. v. 
Paraguay. Monitoring Compliance with Judgment, 
Order of November 19, 2009, para. 45; Case of La 
Cantuta v. Perù. Monitoring Compliance with Judg-
ment, Order of November 20, 2009, para. 18.
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As the above analysis has shown, the decisions of the Inter-
American Court seem to interfere with local memory 
dynamics, bestowing special judicial protection on certain 
memory practices. The Court imposes on states – and on 
societies – practices designed to oblige them to remember. 
Even more significantly, the Court requires states not only to 
undertake measures to remember, but also prescribes what 
and how to remember. However, the Court does so within 
the limits of its mandate, which requires it to order appro-
priate reparations for the harms assessed in the specific case. 
In spite of the advances made in the interpretation of the 
framework of reparations, the Court does not – and perhaps 
cannot – also assess these measures with regard to their 
broader impact on the processes of social reconciliation.
Nevertheless, because the IACtHR is a supranational court, 
the impact of its judgments goes far beyond individual 
cases. Measures of redress directed to individuals can have 
an impact on public policies and, thus, extended effects 
throughout society. The Court is aware of the external 
effects of its jurisprudence and has in fact used its influence 
to instigate reforms and structural changes in many 
member states of the OAS.25 In the light of this awareness, 
the Court began to conceive its jurisprudence not only as 
an instrument to protect and vindicate individuals, but also 
as a powerful tool to orient government decisions in pro-
cesses of democratic transition and in the aftermath of 
human rights crises. This has been the case, for instance, in 
the fight against impunity. The Court’s rulings in cases 
brought on behalf of individual victims have required 
states to adopt legislative reforms that adapt the national 
criminal law systems to human rights standards.26 Simi-
larly, in a series of judgments the Court fought against the 
widespread practice of self-amnesty laws in cases of mass-
ive human rights abuses,27 with the result that amnesties of 
this type have been declared unconstitutional by the con-
stitutional courts of several Latin American countries.
These cases suggest that the IACtHR is therefore aware of 
the potential reach of its decisions. With regard to mem-
ory-related orders, however, the Court seems to underesti-
mate the potential impact on the broader socio-political 
dynamics at the local level. In its decisions, it has limited 
the assessment of these measures to general statements 
about the importance of remembering and the relevance of 
memory-related actions in preventing the repetition of 
similar brutalities, but has failed to consider thoroughly the 
specific contexts in which these measures will take place. It 
seems to neglect the risk of tensions arising between the 
“memory” imposed by the supranational body and other 
conflicting memories that also exist in the social fabric. The 
official sanction of “one memory”, of “one truth”, using 
the language of one particular set of victims, may have the 
undesirable result of exacerbating the tension between the 
victims’ demand for reparations and the need for social 
reconciliation. Moreover, imposing the commemoration of 
a “judicial truth” established by a supranational instance 
may alter the complex process of negotiation through 
which a conflict-riven society achieves a shared view of its 
common past.
3.1. The Case of the Penal Miguel Castro-Castro v. Peru
In November 2006, the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights held Peru responsible for violent acts committed by 
its agents in May 1992 within the maximum security peni-
tentiary Miguel Castro-Castro.28 Since the case provides a 
useful example of the possible implications of the IACtHR’s 
memory-related jurisprudence, it will be discussed below.
25 Organization of American States, created by the 
Charter of the Organization of American States, 30 
April 1948, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/
refworld/docid/3ae6b3624.html. The Inter-
American Court and the Inter-American Commis-
sion are the two organs of this regional system 
entrusted with the promotion and protection of 
human rights.
26 See, for instance, Case of Molina-Theissen v. 
Guatemala. Reparations and Costs. Judgment of July 
3, 2004. Series C No. 108, para. 91, where among 
other provisions the Court ordered Guatemala to 
adopt domestic legislative, administrative provisions 
“to establish: a) an expedite procedure to allow 
statement of absence and presumption of death due 
to forced disappearance, for purposes of parentage, 
inheritance and reparation as well as other related 
civil effects; and b) a genetic information system to 
enable establishment and clarification of parentage 
of missing children and their identification”.
27 Case of Barrios Altos v. Peru. Merits. Judgment 
March 14, 2001. Series C No. 75, para. 42. In the 
Interpretation of the Judgment on the merit of this 
case, the Court declared that this prohibition is gen-
eral in nature and applies to all the laws that present 
the same criteria. Case of Barrios Altos v. Peru. Inter-
pretation of the Judgment on the Merits. Judgment 
of September 3, 2001. Series C No. 83, para. 18.
28 Case of the Miguel Castro-Castro Prison v. 
Peru. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of 
November 25, 2006. Series C No. 160.
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The Castro-Castro case occurred against a background of 
violence and violations of human rights that traumatised 
Peru for twenty years. During the internal conflict that 
paralysed the country between 1980 and 2000, about 
seventy thousand Peruvians were killed and more were dis-
appeared (CVR 2003, introduction). The Peruvian Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission was established in 2001 by 
the new democratic government to shed light on violations 
committed during the years of the conflict. After two years 
of work and investigation, the Commission presented its 
Final Report, which was published in 2003. Members of the 
terrorist group Sendero Luminoso and agents of the state 
were held responsible for most of the violations (CVR 
2003, Annex 2).29 The Commission ascertained that 6,443 
acts of torture and abuse had been perpetrated.
With regard to the case, the Truth and Reconciliation Com-
mision reported that about 175 inmates of the Castro-
Castro prison – mostly women – were severely abused and 
about 42 eventually killed in the course of the military 
operation “Operativo Mudanza 1” ordered by President 
Fujimori (CVR 2003, vol. 7, chap. 2, 67). Most of the vic-
tims were accused of, awaiting trial for or convicted of ter-
rorism or treason offences. They were considered linked to 
the Partido Comunista del Perú – Sendero Luminoso.30 In 
the judgment, after ascertaining the facts of the case, the 
Court accepted the partial acknowledgment of inter-
national responsibility made by Peru and ordered the state 
to undertake both monetary and non-monetary reparation 
measures. Among the latter, it required the state to carry 
out a public act of acknowledgment of responsibility for 
the violations specified in the decision “as any [sic] apology 
to the victims and for the satisfaction of their next of kin”31 
and to commemorate all the victims of the case by inscrib-
ing their names on the memorial “The Eye that Cries”.32 
While commemorative measures had been requested by 
both the Commission and the victims’ representative, their 
requests differed from what the Court ordered. The vic-
tims’ representative requested the construction of a specific 
monument or the creation of a park where the victims’ 
next of kin could plant trees in memory of the deceased. 
The state opposed those requests, arguing that “a monu-
ment (called the Eye that Cries) [had] already been erected 
in a public place of the capital of the Republic in favour of 
all the victims of the conflict, and that it [was] the subject 
of continuous memorial and commemoration acts.”33 The 
Court therefore decided on a compromise and required the 
inscription of the victims’ names on the existing memorial. 
In doing so, however, the Court misread the history and 
meaning of the monument and underestimated the poten-
tial for its memory-order to evoke deeper tensions.
“The Eye that Cries” is a particularly meaningful monu-
ment for Peruvians. It was built in Lima in 2005, thanks to 
the initiative of Peruvian civil society groups, with the aim 
of paying tribute to and preserving the memory of all vic-
tims, as well as to educate about recent Peruvian history.34 A 
trickle of water runs incessantly from a large, granite 
boulder at the centre of the memorial, which is surrounded 
by a labyrinthe of concentric circles made of thirty-two 
thousand little stones, on which the names of some of the 
victims are engraved. The memorial represents Pachamama, 
the Andean Mother Earth, who cries for her children.35
29 Sendero Luminoso was deemed responsible for 
46 percent of the acts of violence, while state agents 
were considered responsible for 30 percent.
30 Miguel Castro-Castro Prison v. Peru (2006), 
para. 197.
31 Miguel Castro-Castro Prison v. Peru (2006), 
operative part of the judgment, point 12. In light of 
the meaning of the paragraph, the “any” in the 
quote should be considered a typographical error 
for “an”. This is also confirmed by the official Span-
ish version of the judgment.
32 Ibid. para. 463
33 Ibid. para. 454 (italics added)
34 http://www.elojoquellora.pe/
35 Ibid.
Figure 1: “The Eye that Cries”, Campo de Marte, Lima, Perú. 
Photo: Art Dino
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The inscription of the names of the victims in the Castro-
Castro case was potentially capable of conveying a strong 
symbolic message to Peruvian society and offering public 
redress to the memory of the victims. Nevertheless, the 
political proximity of those individuals to terrorist groups 
and their potential involvement in the civil conflict framed 
the Court’s decision in a different perspective, sparking 
violent reactions in the country. On the one hand, human 
rights activists and those who defended the ruling upheld 
the importance of condemning the acts of violence per-
petrated by the Fujimori regime, regardless of the political 
past of the deceased; on the other hand, the majority of the 
population felt uneasy about the decision to conflate mem-
orialisation of “innocent victims” of the conflict (that is, of 
those civilians whose names had been originally inscribed 
in the memorial), with commemoration of those who were 
victims according to the Court’s decision, yet perceived by 
the public as “perpetrators”. Protests, sit-ins, heated public 
debates and political declarations against the Court’s deci-
sion, which went as far as questioning the Court’s auth-
ority, took place around the country, and the monument 
was vandalised. These social and political tensions brought 
to light the reality that the Peruvian past has not yet been 
dealt with in society.
The Court’s judgment brought to light persistent memory 
conflicts. Yet, in Ciurlizza’s words, the decision “pours salt 
in the open wound”. The public opinion received the deci-
sion as a “revealed truth”, as an “axiom that nullifies any 
discussion”, an insult to the suffering of the society and, 
paradoxically, a denial of social memory (Ciurlizza 2007). 
In the attempt to address the dual reparatory functions of 
memory as satisfaction and prevention, the Court’s ruling 
clashed with the reconciliatory function of another mem-
ory that had been negotiated within the Peruvian social 
fabric and was still struggling to be accepted and accom-
modated in that social fabric. As a result of this clash, the 
intrinsic link between memory and identity, which makes 
memory-related measures crucial for the process of social 
reconstruction in the aftermath of traumatic events, was 
broken, because of the interference of an external actor. 
This legal construction of memory, decided from above, is 
viewed as an external imposition and an outside element 
that can play no role in the social dynamics of making 
sense of past atrocities. From a symbol of unity and solida-
rity for all victims, “The Eye that Cries” became a site of 
contestation and division.36
36 The fascinating and complex nature of the 
memorial – and of the history it tells – led many 
scholars, mostly from the memory studies field, to 
engage with its meaning. Especially since 2007, after 
it was subjected to acts of vandalism, the monument 
has been in the centre of the memory debates in 
Peru. Scholars have used the recent history of “The 
Eye that Cries” as a starting point to investigate and 
analyse the deeper roots and dynamics of the con-
flicting interpretations of the Peruvian past and 
memory polemic (Milton 2011; Drinot 2009; Hite 
2007).
Figure 2: “The Eye that Cries” memorial following vandalisation on 23 
September 2007. 
Photo: APRODEH archive
 4. Conclusion
International human rights law has seen recent advances in 
the legal regime for reparations in cases of grave abuses of 
human rights. In particular, traditional mechanisms of the 
reparation system have been revised in the light of theories 
and practices developed in the field of transitional justice. 
This has resulted in the adoption of more complex and 
flexible reparation schemes by states and human rights 
bodies that better adapt to the particular features of the 
IJCV: Vol. 8 (1) 2014, pp. 61 – 74
Maria Chiara Campisi: Memory as Reparation in the Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 73
transition to democracy. This article has drawn attention to 
the role that memory-related initiatives have come to play 
in the revised system of redress in post-conflict and post-
violence contexts. The Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, in particular, through its jurisprudence on repar-
ations, has used those measures as part of reparatory 
schemes designed to adequately redress situations where 
there has been widespread abuse. Memory-related 
measures, in the legal judgment of the Court, contribute to 
both satisfaction for victims and guarantees of non-repeti-
tion. The “obligation to memory”, understood in a narrow 
sense as the obligation to put in place acts of commem-
oration and remembrance for past atrocities, has thereby 
been progressively recognised as a component of the inter-
national obligation to provide reparation for victims. As 
such, according to the general principles on reparation 
under international law, memory-related measures used as 
reparation should be commensurate with the specific 
harms to individual victims and, at the same time, with the 
collective interest to prevent future abuses.
However, while the incorporation of memory-related ini-
tiatives into the framework of reparations may open the 
latter to their transformative potentiality, it is doubtful 
whether judicial decisions are the most appropriate tool to 
establish the specifics of how and when those measures 
should be used. As the Peruvian case has demonstrated, the 
impact of legal decisions that make use of memory-related 
measures may eventually lead to unforeseen and undesired 
negative results within broader social memory processes. 
Although in the Castro-Castro case the Court tried to strike 
a balance between the different requests of the parties, it 
failed to consider the wider social and collective dimension 
of the memory-related initiatives. It failed to pay careful 
attention to the complex nature of memory processes within 
a society in transition, and instead limited its considerations 
to an assessment of the impact of memory-related measures 
on the parties to the case. This failure occurred even though 
the Court has demonstrated awareness and pursuit of wider 
social and political effects in other cases. 
In spite of this negative assessment, I do believe that there 
is a role for the law in encouraging the elaboration of a col-
lective memory. To do this effectively, however, courts and 
tribunals should pay more attention to the wider social 
impact of legal decisions. They should be aware of the 
internal struggles for identity and reconstruction within 
the societies in which their decision will have to be imple-
mented; they should listen to the existing social narratives 
and understand their inter-relations. In doing so, courts 
would move from the role of memory-makers, which 
impose a specific and partial interpretation of the past 
from above, to the role of memory-facilitators, conscious 
of the many layers involved in the process of rethinking the 
past, and therefore providing a forum for different voices 
and narratives to discuss possible representations of the 
past. This is a difficult challenge. However, if the law wants 
to venture into the intricate and delicate aspects of individ-
ual and social processes of coming to terms with the past, 
judges and legislators must develop a much deeper level of 
engagement with the effort to first understand, and then 
speak the language of memory.
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